Will Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull's lack of judgement place Australia at risk?

Prime Minister and Liberal MP for Wentworth, Malcolm Bligh Turnbull, was happy to say this to the Australian people on 20 April 2017, during an interview with ABC TV 7.30 current affairs host Leigh Sales:

“I do. I trust the judgment, the wisdom of the American government, the president and the vice president.”

Two days later he meets with U.S. Vice President Pence in Sydney and showers him with uncritical praise of American policy.

Two weeks after that he was in the United States meeting with President Donald Trump and expressing solidarity with his government.

Of that visit the prime minister stated; “It was great for Lucy and I to meet with the president and Mrs Trump. Again, that was more family than formal.”

Given the following, one wonders if Australia should trust the current U.S. government as much as Turnbull professes he does.

The Washington Post, 15 May 2017:

President Trump revealed highly classified information to the Russian foreign minister and ambassador in a White House meeting last week, according to current and former U.S. officials, who said Trump’s disclosures jeopardized a critical source of intelligence on the Islamic State.

The information the president relayed had been provided by a U.S. partner through an intelligence-sharing arrangement considered so sensitive that details have been withheld from allies and tightly restricted even within the U.S. government, officials said.

The partner had not given the United States permission to share the material with Russia, and officials said Trump’s decision to do so endangers cooperation from an ally that has access to the inner workings of the Islamic State. After Trump’s meeting, senior White House officials took steps to contain the damage, placing calls to the CIA and the National Security Agency.

“This is code-word information,” said a U.S. official familiar with the matter, using terminology that refers to one of the highest classification levels used by American spy agencies. Trump “revealed more information to the Russian ambassador than we have shared with our own allies.”

The New York Times, 15 May 2017:

In fact, the current official said that Mr. Trump shared granular details of the intelligence with the Russians. Among the details the president shared was the city in Syria where the ally picked up information about the plot, though Mr. Trump is not believed to have disclosed that the intelligence came from a Middle Eastern ally or precisely how it was gathered.

General McMaster did not address that in naming the city, in Islamic State-controlled territory, Mr. Trump gave Russia an important clue about the source of the information.

Like the United States, Russia is also fighting in Syria, where it has stationed troops and aircraft. The two countries share some information, but the cooperation is extremely limited, and each has widely divergent goals in the civil war there.

Russia’s primary focus has been propping up the government of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, not directly battling the Islamic State. The United States, in contrast, views the Islamic State as the primary threat, and is aiding rebels who are fighting both the Islamic State and the Syrian government.

The Washington Post, 16 May 2017:

H.R. McMaster, the president's top security adviser, repeatedly described the president's actions in a press briefing just a day after a Washington Post story revealed that Trump had shared deeply sensitive information with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during an Oval Office meeting last week.

"In the context of that discussion, what the president discussed with the foreign minister was wholly appropriate to that conversation and is consistent with the routine sharing of information between the president and any leaders with whom he’s engaged," McMaster said. "It is wholly appropriate for the president to share whatever information he thinks is necessary to advance the security of the American people. That’s what he did."

McMaster refused to confirm whether the information the president shared with the Russians was highly classified. However, because the president has broad authority to declassify information, it is unlikely that his disclosures to the Russians were illegal — as they would have been had just about anyone else in government shared the same secrets. But the classified information he shared with a geopolitical foe was nonetheless explosive, having been provided by a critical U.S. partner through an intelligence-sharing arrangement considered so delicate that some details were withheld even from top allies and other government officials.

McMaster added that Trump made a spur-of-the-moment decision to share the information in the context of the conversation he was having with the Russian officials. He said that "the president wasn’t even aware of where this information came from" and had not been briefed on the source.

McMaster's pushback came just hours after Trump himself acknowledged Tuesday morning in a pair of tweets that he had indeed revealed highly classified information to Russia — a stunning confirmation of the Washington Post story and a move that seemed to contradict his own White House team after it scrambled to deny the report.

Trump's tweets tried to explain away the news, which emerged late Monday, that he had shared sensitive, “code-word” information with the Russian foreign minister and ambassador during the White House meeting last week.

Trump described his talks with the Russians as “an openly scheduled” meeting at the White House. In fact, the gathering was closed to all U.S. media, although a photographer for the Russian state-owned news agency was allowed into the Oval Office, prompting national security concerns.

The Atlantic, 16 May 2017:

Would the president have so abjectly tried to impress representatives of any other country? He blabbed because he bragged, and he bragged because he values Russia’s and Putin’s goodwill so bizarrely much. As the economist Justin Wolfers noted, if officials had not revealed the truth to the media, the Russians would now genuinely have damaging kompromat on Trump: the secret of a dereliction of duty that would have gotten anybody else in government fired, if not indicted.

On 18 May 2017 the Full House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has set a 9.30am 24 May 2017 hearing date to investigate if President Trump interfered in an FBI probe into the his election campaign's ties to Russia.

Even in the face of Trump’s intelligence disclosures to the Russians Turnbull declares his trust in the current U.S. Government.

As a member of the top-secret Five Eyes global surveillance and intelligence sharing group Australia is potentially affected by Trump’s loose lips and, it is becoming increasingly possible that a prime minister who trusts Trump is an additional risk to his own country's national security.

FACTS OF THE MATTER: Trump, Russia and the 2016 U.S. presidential election

FACTS UNDER OATH

GRAHAM: OK. Do you stand by your testimony that there is an active investigation counterintelligence investigation regarding Trump campaign individuals in the Russian government as to whether not to collaborate? You said that in March...

COMEY: To see if there was any coordination between the Russian effort and peoples...

GRAHAM: Is that still going on?

COMEY: Yes.

GRAHAM: OK. So nothing's changed. You stand by those two statements?

COMEY: Correct. ……

SEN. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, D-CONN.: Thanks. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you Director Comey for being here and thank you to you and the men and women who work with you at the FBI for their extraordinary service to our country, much of it unappreciated as you've wrote so powerfully in your opening statement. You have confirmed, I believe, that the FBI is investigating potential ties between Trump Associates and the Russian interference in the 2016 campaign, correct?

COMEY: Yes.

BLUMENTHAL: And you have not, to my knowledge, ruled out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target of that criminal investigation, correct?

COMEY: Well, I haven't said anything publicly about who we've opened investigations on, I briefed the chair and ranking on who those people are. And so I can't -- I can't go beyond that in this setting. [FBI Director James B. Comey responds to a questions from Senator Lindsey Graham (Republican-South Carolina) and Senator Richard Blumenthal (Democrat-Connecticut) during the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee investigation into “Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”, commencing 10am US EDT 3 May 2017, transcript published in The Washington Post]

With respect to the Russian investigation, we treated it like we did with the Clinton investigation. We didn't say a word about it until months into it and then the only thing we've confirmed so far about this is the same thing with the Clinton investigation. That we are investigating. And I would expect, we're not going to say another peep about it until we're done. And I don't know what will be said when we're done, but that's the way we handled the Clinton investigation as well…….

In that particular investigation, my judgment was that it — that the appearance of fairness and independence required that it be removed from the political chain of command within the Department of Justice, because as you recall, it seems like a lifetime ago. But that also involved the conduct of people who were senior-level people in the White House, and my judgment was that even I, as an independent-minded person, was a political appointee and so I ought to give it to a career person like Pat Fitzgerald.

The Russians used cyber operations against both political parties, including hacking into servers used by the Democratic National Committee and releasing stolen data to WikiLeaks and other media outlets. Russia also collected on certain Republican Party- affiliated targets, but did not release any Republican-related data. The Intelligence Community Assessment concluded first that President Putin directed and influenced campaign to erode the faith and confidence of the American people in our presidential election process. Second, that he did so to demean Secretary Clinton, and third, that he sought to advantage Mr. Trump. These conclusions were reached based on the richness of the information gathered and analyzed and were thoroughly vetted and then approved by the directors of the three agencies and me. [JAMES R. CLAPPER JR., former Director Of National Intelligence August 2010–January 2017, giving evidence before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee investigation into “Russian Interference in the 2016 United States Election”, commencing 4.30am AEST 9 May 2017, transcript published in The Washington Post]

When the Intelligence Community obtains information suggesting that a U.S. person is acting on behalf of a foreign power, the standard procedure is to share that information with the FBI. The Bureau then decides whether to look into that information and handles any ensuing investigation, if there is one.

Given its sensitivity, even the existence of a counterintelligence investigation is closely held, including at the highest levels. During my tenure as DNI, it was my practice to defer to the FBI Director – both Director Mueller and Director Comey – on whether, when, and to what extent they would inform me about such investigations. This stems from the unique position of the FBI, which straddles both intelligence and law enforcement. As a consequence, I was not aware of the counterintelligence investigation Director Comey first referred to during his testimony before the House intelligence committee on March 20th, and that comports with my public statements. [JAMES R. CLAPPER, former Director of National Intelligence, giving evidence before the U.S. Committee On The Judiciary Subcommittee On Crime And Terrorism United States Senate investigation into “Russian Interference in the 2016 United States Election”, 8 May 2017, transcript]

I had two in-person meetings and one phone call with the White House Counsel about Mr. Flynn. The first meeting occurred on January 26, called Don McGahn first thing that morning and told him that I had a very sensitive matter that I needed to discuss with him, that I couldn't talk about it on the phone and that I needed to come see him. And he agreed to meet with me later that afternoon.

I took a senior member of the national security division who was overseeing this matter with me to meet with Mr. McGahn. We met in his office at the White House which is a skiff (ph) so we could discuss classified information in his office. We began our meeting telling him that there had been press accounts of statements from the vice president and others that related conduct that Mr. Flynn had been involved in that we knew not to be the truth.

And as I - as I tell you what happened here, again I'm going to be very careful not to reveal classified information…..

So I told them again that there were a number of press accounts of statements that had been made by the vice president and other high-ranking White House officials about General Flynn's conduct that we knew to be untrue. And we told them how we knew that this - how we had this information, how we had acquired it, and how we knew that it was untrue.

And we walked the White House Counsel who also had an associate there with him through General Flynn's underlying conduct, the contents of which I obviously cannot go through with you today because it's classified. But we took him through in a fair amount of detail of the underlying conduct, what General Flynn had done, and then we walked through the various press accounts and how it had been falsely reported.

We also told the White House Counsel that General Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI on February 24. Mr. McGahn asked me how he did and I declined to give him an answer to that. And we then walked through with Mr. McGahn essentially why we were telling them about this and the first thing we did was to explain to Mr. McGahn that the underlying conduct that General Flynn had engaged in was problematic in and of itself.

Secondly, we told him we felt like the vice president and others were entitled to know that the information that they were conveying to the American people wasn't true. And we wanted to make it really clear right out of the gate that we were not accusing Vice President Pence of knowingly providing false information to the American people.

And, in fact, Mr. McGahn responded back to me to let me know that anything that General Flynn would've said would have been based -- excuse me -- anything that Vice President Pence would have said would have been based on what General Flynn had told him.

We told him the third reason was -- is because we were concerned that the American people had been misled about the underlying conduct and what General Flynn had done, and additionally, that we weren't the only ones that knew all of this, that the Russians also knew about what General Flynn had done.

And the Russians also knew that General Flynn had misled the vice president and others, because in the media accounts, it was clear from the vice president and others that they were repeating what General Flynn had told them, and that this was a problem because not only did we believe that the Russians knew this, but that they likely had proof of this information.

And that created a compromise situation, a situation where the national security adviser essentially could be blackmailed by the Russians. Finally, we told them that we were giving them all of this information so that they could take action, the action that they deemed appropriate.

I remember that Mr. McGahn asked me whether or not General Flynn should be fired, and I told him that that really wasn't our call, that was up to them, but that we were giving them this information so that they could take action, and that was the first meeting.

[SALLY C. YATES, former Deputy U.S. Attorney-General & former Acting Attorney-General January 2015-January 2017, giving evidence before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee investigation into “Russian Interference in the 2016 United States Election”, commencing 4.30am AEST 9 May 2017, transcript published in The Washington Post]

‘ALTERNATIVE FACTS’

[https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/861712617299210240 & https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/861713233786404864]

via @SeanMcElwee 

HOLT: Monday, you met with Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein. Did you ask for a recommendation?
TRUMP: What I did was, I was going to fire. My decision. I was not...
HOLT: You’d made the decision before they came into the room?
TRUMP: I was going to fire Comey. There’s no good time to do it by the way.
HOLT: In your letter, you said, ‘I accept their recommendation.’ 
TRUMP: Oh, I was going to fire, regardless of recommendation. He made a recommendation, he’s highly respected — very good guy, very smart guy. And the Democrats like him, Republicans like him. He made a recommendation, but regardless of recommendation, I was going to fire Comey. [Excerpt from NBC News Lester Holt interview with Donald Trump on 11 May 2017]

A Russian government think tank controlled by Vladimir Putin developed a plan to swing the 2016 U.S. presidential election to Donald Trump

Reuters, 19 April 2017:

(Reuters) - A Russian government think tank controlled by Vladimir Putin developed a plan to swing the 2016 U.S. presidential election to Donald Trump and undermine voters’ faith in the American electoral system, three current and four former U.S. officials told Reuters.

They described two confidential documents from the think tank as providing the framework and rationale for what U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded was an intensive effort by Russia to interfere with the Nov. 8 election. U.S. intelligence officials acquired the documents, which were prepared by the Moscow-based Russian Institute for Strategic Studies [en.riss.ru/], after the election.

The institute is run by retired senior Russian foreign intelligence officials appointed by Putin’s office.

The first Russian institute document was a strategy paper written last June that circulated at the highest levels of the Russian government but was not addressed to any specific individuals.

It recommended the Kremlin launch a propaganda campaign on social media and Russian state-backed global news outlets to encourage U.S. voters to elect a president who would take a softer line toward Russia than the administration of then-President Barack Obama, the seven officials said.

A second institute document, drafted in October and distributed in the same way, warned that Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton was likely to win the election. For that reason, it argued, it was better for Russia to end its pro-Trump propaganda and instead intensify its messaging about voter fraud to undermine the U.S. electoral system’s legitimacy and damage Clinton’s reputation in an effort to undermine her presidency, the seven officials said.

The current and former U.S. officials spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the Russian documents’ classified status. They declined to discuss how the United States obtained them. U.S. intelligence agencies also declined to comment on them.

Putin has denied interfering in the U.S. election. Putin’s spokesman and the Russian institute did not respond to requests for comment.

The documents were central to the Obama administration's conclusion that Russia mounted a “fake news” campaign and launched cyber attacks against Democratic Party groups and Clinton's campaign, the current and former officials said.

“Putin had the objective in mind all along, and he asked the institute to draw him a road map,” said one of the sources, a former senior U.S. intelligence official.

Trump has said Russia’s activities had no impact on the outcome of the race. Ongoing congressional and FBI investigations into Russian interference have so far produced no public evidence that Trump associates colluded with the Russian effort to change the outcome of the election.

Four of the officials said the approach outlined in the June strategy paper was a broadening of an effort the Putin administration launched in March 2016. That month the Kremlin instructed state-backed media outlets, including international platforms Russia Today and Sputnik news agency, to start producing positive reports on Trump’s quest for the U.S. presidency, the officials said.

Russia Today did not respond to a request for comment. A spokesperson for Sputnik dismissed the assertions by the U.S. officials that it participated in a Kremlin campaign as an “absolute pack of lies.” “And by the way, it's not the first pack of lies we're hearing from 'sources in U.S. official circles'," the spokesperson said in an email.

Pro-Kremlin Bloggers…..

The report said Russia Today and Sputnik “consistently cast president elect-Trump as the target of unfair coverage from traditional media outlets."…..

Cyber Attacks

Neither of the Russian institute documents mentioned the release of hacked Democratic Party emails to interfere with the U.S. election, according to four of the officials. The officials said the hacking was a covert intelligence operation run separately out of the Kremlin.

The overt propaganda and covert hacking efforts reinforced each other, according to the officials. Both Russia Today and Sputnik heavily promoted the release of the hacked Democratic Party emails, which often contained embarrassing details.

Five of the U.S. officials described the institute as the Kremlin’s in-house foreign policy think tank……..

Read the full article here.

It's as official as it is ever going to get - the Russian Government decided it would like this man to be the 45th President of the United States of America

It's as official as it is ever going to get - the Russian Government decided it would like this man to be the 45th President of the United States of America.

Donald John Trump

U.S. National Intelligence Council, Intelligence Community Assessment, 6 January 2017, excerpt:

“This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections

ICA 2017-01D

6 January 2017

Key Judgments

Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations. We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in these judgments.

 We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence.

 Moscow’s approach evolved over the course of the campaign based on Russia’s understanding of the electoral prospects of the two main candidates. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on undermining her future presidency.

 Further information has come to light since Election Day that, when combined with Russian behaviour since early November 2016, increases our confidence in our assessments of Russian motivations and goals.

Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations — such as cyber activity — with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.” Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.

 Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political parties.

 We assess with high confidence that Russian military intelligence (General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU) used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets and relayed material to WikiLeaks.

 Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards. DHS assesses that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying.

 Russia’s state-run propaganda machine contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.

We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes.”

Full declassified report can be found here.

Australian Federal Election 2016: genes are destiny excuse

Journalist Jennifer Oriel in The Australian on 11 April 2016, putting the case for a two-tiered national education system where public schools and their 'dumb' students living in comparative poverty are offered less opportunity because genetics are allegedly destiny:

More punitive taxes and big spender social programs in education and health are central pillars of ALP plans for fiscal repair. The former is aimed at reducing the deficit Labor increased by squandering the proceeds of the mining boom. It wasted billions on cash splashes and social programs that have failed to achieve stated policy goals in improving educational and social outcomes. Now the party needs a scapegoat. The politics of envy provides an endless supply…..

Whether the object of envy is intelligence, talent, beauty, status or wealth, there is always a group that feels entitled to what nature or nurture did not provide. If they cannot take the envied trait or property by force, the envious seek to deride those who bear it.

As a unifying political device, the emotion of envy has few equals. In Australia, it finds social form in the tall poppy syndrome. Visitors to Australia long have remarked upon the darker side envy amplifies in our national character.….

Modern Labor began its campaign against Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull by sowing envy about his wealth and international investments. But the collective envy required to justify a circular regimen of Keynesian redistribution demands a collective target and policy goals that are always just out of reach, either because they are unattainable or conveniently unquantifiable. Equality of outcome is the substantive socialist solution.

While liberals support equal opportunity and formal equality, socialists engineer equality of outcome through policy prescriptions increasingly at odds with science. Labor’s education policy is a case in point. In a letter to school principals last week, Bill Shorten committed to redressing inequality by promising money the government doesn’t have to fund Gonski education reforms. Despite the sound aim of improving the educational outcomes of all children, at a cost of $37.3 billion, delivering the Gonksi policy through government inflicts a heavy toll on the taxpayer with doubtful return on investment. Numerous private companies provide high efficacy literacy and numeracy programs while decades of government-run interventions have had little impact in levelling educational outcomes. And recent research indicates the Gonski reform package, like numerous social programs before it, is unlikely to succeed.

Despite Labor’s education revolution and promises of substantive equality, vast differences in educational outcomes continue. The most recent research suggests a reason for inequality of educational attainment that should provoke a rethink of social and economic policy. Speaking on SBS’s Insight program, Brian Byrne of the University of New England revealed findings of soon to be published research with colleagues at the Centre of Excellence for Cognition and its Disorders. It indicates that genes are the most important determinant of maths and reading skills among schoolchildren. Their study of twins’ NAPLAN performance apparently found that maths, reading and spelling skills are up to 75 per cent genetic and writing skills are about 50 per cent genetic. The influence of schools and teachers, the focus of Labor’s policies, accounts for only about 5 per cent of performance.

Social psychologist Richard Nisbett was more hopeful in his assessment of the nature versus nurture debate in education. In Intelligence and How to Get It, he analyses research on various interventions to improve the educational outcomes of children from poor backgrounds. Some appeared promising, but many had only a modest impact whose effect diminished.

Recent research suggesting academic performance is substantially heritable challenges existing literature in which academics and politicians extol the benefits of government interventions to redress educational inequality. But it could be used constructively to drive policy reforms that provide greater choice in school and university education to cater to inborn differences…… [my red bolding]

There we have it in a nutshell - genes are destiny, a second-tier education system is advisable and anyone who suggests otherwise is suffering from pathological envy.

However, the journalist wasn't being as honest as possible concerning the views of Emeritus Professor Brian Byrne.

Here are two quotes from the answers he gave the Insight program moderator when questioned about that international twin study, which included twins from the Sydney area:

JENNY BROCKIE: This is what's genetic, what's inherited? 

PROFESSOR BRYAN BYRNE: What's genetic, for the NAPLAN varies between about 50 and 75 percent of the differences amongst children's performance can be traced back to genetic differences which leaves a fair bit for the environment…..

JENNY BROCKIE: And genes aren't destiny Bryan we need to make that very clear? 

PROFESSOR BRYAN BYRNE: That's right. 

Nor does the journalist specifically mention that Professor Dr. Richard Nisbett has formed a view that genetics matters less than differences in family environment and culture when it comes to intelligence and educational outcomes.

Fighting in Apple Inc's corner in court battle wth US Federal Bureau of Investigation are......

In the matter of the search of an Apple iPhone seized during the execution of a search warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California license plate 35kgd203 and the demand that Apple Inc. create new software to break its own privacy safeguards and potentially its encryption codes, the IT world steps in to help.

Apple Inc media release, Amicus Briefs in Support of Apple, 3 March 2015:

Amicus Briefs

§  32 Law Professors

§  Access Now and Wickr Foundation | Press Release

§  ACT/The App Association | Medium Post

§  Airbnb, Atlassian, Automattic, CloudFlare, eBay, GitHub, Kickstarter, LinkedIn, Mapbox, Medium, Meetup, Reddit, Square, Squarespace, Twilio, Twitter and Wickr | Automattic & WordPress.com Blog Post | Kickstarter Blog Post | Meetup Blog Post| Tweet from Twitter

§  Amazon, Box, Cisco, Dropbox, Evernote, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, Nest, Pinterest, Slack, Snapchat, WhatsApp, and Yahoo | Tweet from Box | Cisco Blog Post | Evernote Blog Post  | Facebook Statement | Microsoft Blog Post | Mozilla Blog Post | Snapchat Blog Post | WhatsApp Facebook Post | Yahoo Tumblr Post

§  American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of Southern California, and ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties | Blog Post

§  AT&T | Public Policy Blog Post

§  AVG Technologies, Data Foundry, Golden Frog, the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), the Internet Association, and the Internet Infrastructure Coalition | Golden Frog Blog | CCIA News

§ BSA|The Software Alliance, the Consumer Technology Association, the Information Technology Industry Council, and TechNet | Press Release

§  Center for Democracy & Technology | Press Release | Blog Post | Podcast

§  Electronic Frontier Foundation and 46 technologists, researchers, and cryptographers | Blog Post | Press Release

§ Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and eight consumer privacy organizations | EPIC Top News

§  Intel | Blog Post

§ iPhone security and applied cryptography experts including Dino Dai Zovi, Dan Boneh (Stanford), Charlie Miller, Dr. Hovav Shacham (UC San Diego), Bruce Schneier (Harvard), Dan Wallach (Rice) and Jonathan Zdziarski | Blog Post

§  Lavabit

§The Media Institute | Press Release

§  Privacy International and Human Rights Watch

Letters to the Court

§  Beats, Rhymes & Relief, Center for Media Justice, The Gathering for Justice, Justice League NYC, Opal Tometi and Shaun King

§  David Kaye, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression | Supporting Document

§   Salihin Kondoker, San Bernardino, CA

UPDATE

Cnet, 9 March 2016:

The latest figure with an opinion on the fight between Apple and the FBI is none other than NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden.

His conclusion? The FBI's claim that only Apple can bypass the security of the iPhone used by a terrorist is bogus.

"The FBI says Apple has the 'exclusive technical means' of getting into this phone," Snowden said Tuesday.

Snowden called the claim malarky, without using such a polite term. "Respectfully, that's bulls***," he said.

The former National Security Agency contractor, who fled the US and lives in Russia, made the remarks while speaking via a video link from Moscow at advocacy group Common Cause's conference in Washington DC.

Australia's intelligence agencies already fail to comply with safeguards in national security legislation. Why are they now being given more powers than ever before?

As the Abbott Government prepares to enact sweeping changes to Australia’s national security laws, with the co-operation of the Labor Opposition and only weak recommendations from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to amend the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill, it is worth remembering that this nation’s intelligence agencies already often fail to comply with safeguards built into existing legislation.

It is also worth noting that compliance oversight of these agencies does not involve inspecting all agency activities/warrants and relies heavily on voluntary self-reporting by these same agencies.

Excerpts from the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Annual Report 2013–14:

In 2013–14 we reviewed approximately half of the warrants obtained by ASIO. These inspections occur after the Attorney-General has authorised the warrant and usually after ASIO has completed the operation and reported back to the Attorney-General.

During 2013–14 our inspection program identified four errors in ASIO’s execution of warrant powers, each of which constituted a breach of either the ASIO Act or the TIA Act.

My office identified one breach under the ASIO Act relating to delay by ASIO in revoking a warrant. The ASIO Act requires ASIO to inform the minister ‘forthwith’ once the grounds on which the warrant was issued cease to exist. For the warrant in question there was a considerable delay in providing the relevant notification to the Attorney-General.

As noted in previous annual reports, I have a particular interest in ASIO’s use of B-Party warrants because of the potential for intrusive collection of material that is not relevant to security. In 2013–14 there was a modest increase in the use of such warrants following a decrease the previous year. This increase was due to a growth in the number of Australians involved in foreign conflicts. Most of these warrants are reviewed by my office. I am currently consulting with the Attorney-General’s Department about ASIO’s interpretation of the provisions in the TIA that restrict the availability of B-party warrant.

My office identified one instance when ASIO communicated information on Australian persons to a non-approved foreign authority responsible for issuing passports for that country. The case raised complex legal issues and at the end of the reporting period I had not formed a final view on whether approval from the Attorney-General was strictly legally required; however, my view is that at least as a matter of propriety and compliance with the intention of the restrictions the matter should have gone to the Attorney-General.

In one case I questioned whether the justification given for the internal security investigation was sufficient or reasonable, having regard to all of the circumstances. In particular I questioned whether it was appropriate for personal information about a member of the public to be passed to an ASIO officer who had expressed concerns that the individual might pose a risk to the officer’s own personal safety. I was advised at the time that all ASIO staff members could access some ASIO holdings to perform checks on individuals, including neighbours and social contacts that might relate to personal security or safety. I expressed concern that ASIO did not have formal processes in place to ensure that personal information in ASIO’s holdings about a member of the public could not be released to a staff member or accessed directly by the staff member. In my view, this is out of step with community expectations in respect of privacy.

In one instance ASIS had been aware that the person was Australian but this had not been well documented or communicated. This was a breach of the privacy rules. It was subsequently found that there was also a breach of the requirement that ASIS only communicate intelligence in accordance with government requirements and the requirement for ministerial authorisation before taking action to produce intelligence on an Australian person. There is further information on this case below….there had been unauthorised collection against the individual breaching the ISA’s requirement that ASIS ‘obtain ministerial authorisation before undertaking any activity to produce intelligence on an Australian person’ (s.8) after ASIS first became aware of the individual’s dual nationality in July 2012. ASIS investigated the case further. I received a copy of the final report from the Director-General in June 2014, which confirmed there had been a breach of both section 6(1)(b) and section 8 of the ISA, as well as a breach of the privacy rules.

ASIS reported two breaches because the privacy rules were not applied to reporting on a person known to be an Australian person. Inspections by my office identified an additional two breaches where the privacy rules had not been applied. ASIS subsequently amended all four reports and applied the privacy rules retrospectively.

The May 2014 inspection confirmed one breach of the ISA, where an ASIS officer who had not been approved for training in or the use of weapons discharged a firearm in a skills maintenance session in March 2014….. a further two breaches of the ISA relating to the unapproved use of weapons by ASIS officers during the reporting period: one at a skills maintenance session in September 2013 and one at a firing range in December 2013.

In January 2014, DSD separately provided to me their final report on a breach of the ISA which occurred during October 2013, where incomplete records had resulted in DSD conducting intelligence collection activity on a person known to be Australian. During the reporting period I continued to inspect cancellations of ministerial authorisations and non-renewal reports to the Minister for Defence under sections 10 and 10A of the ISA. In September 2013, as part of our regular inspection of DSD activities, I asked DSD to confirm that intelligence collection against several subjects had ceased (as had been advised by DSD to the Minister for Defence). DSD advised that collection against one subject had continued for several months beyond the expiry of the ministerial authorisation, in breach of the requirements specified in the ISA.

In two cases there were breaches of the privacy rules as the presumption of nationality was not applied reasonably by DSD. In both cases, intelligence collection activity occurred against Australian persons in circumstances where DSD already had information indicating that the individuals concerned were Australian persons, but in each case members of staff had failed to make appropriate inquiries of existing DSD records. In addition to these cases being breaches of the presumption rule in the privacy rules, the action taken to produce intelligence on an Australian person was inconsistent with the ministerial authorisation requirement in the ISA. During 2013–14, I assessed two instances where DSD communicated information about an Australian person not in accordance with the privacy rules. Both incidents resulted from a failure to follow established compliance processes.

During my 2013–14 inspection program, a breach of Section 133(1) of the AML/CTF Act was identified whereby ASIO communicated AUSTRAC information to a foreign intelligence agency without first receiving appropriate undertakings for the protection and use of the information.

Abbott Government intends to give ASIO the power to use force against Australian citizens

slippery slope

phrase

1. a course of action likely to lead to something bad or disastrous

[www.oxforddictionaries.com]

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott has told the world that he does not intend to go to the UN climate change conference on 23 September 2014 because it was more important that he be in the House of Representatives while some remaining budget measures and national security legislation are debated in both houses – including the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014 currently before the Senate.

This particular bill will allow the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to use force against persons when executing property searches.

Something that under existing legislation ASIO officers apparently have no right to do and, this new muscle rather disturbingly will even be able to be flexed during searches when law enforcement officers are not present.

In exercising this ability to use force, the Abbott Government intends to offer immunity to ASIO officers under s35K of the bill providing they don't kill, seriously injure or sexually assault a person during special intelligence operations - leaving an incredible amount of leeway for adrenalin-charged security personnel to inflict physical punishment.

In its September 2014 advisory report the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has signed off on this new power.

Although the Committee does accept that; If not appropriately constrained, the use of force against persons by ASIO officers could, over time, change the basic premise of the way ASIO operates.

Which would have to rate as the understatement of the year.

Rather optimistically the Abbott Government’s explanatory memorandum accompanying this bill states that it is compatible with internationally recognised human rights and freedoms.

However, the general public are unlikely to be able to test that assertion against circumstances on the ground, as the same bill enables the federal government to prosecute and gaol journalists (for up to five years) if they report on special intelligence operations without permission.